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STRATEGIC LAW AVOIDANCE USING
THE INTERNET: A SHORT HISTORY
TIM Wu*
We are now some twenty years into the story of the Internet's bold
challenge to law and the legal system. In the early 2000s, Jack Goldsmith
and I wrote Who Controls the Internet, a book that might be understood as
a chronicle of some the early and more outlandish stages of the story.1
Professors
Pollman
and Barry's
excellent article,
Regulatory
Entrepreneurship,adds to and updates that story with subsequent chapters
and a sophisticated analysis of the strategies more recently employed to
avoid law using the Internet in some way. 2 While Pollman and Barry's
article stands on its own, I write this Article to connect these two periods. I
also wish to offer a slightly different normative assessment of the legal
avoidance efforts described here, along with my opinion as to how law
enforcement should conduct itself in these situations.
Behind regulatory entrepreneurship lies a history, albeit a short one,
and one that has much to teach us about the very nature of law and the legal
system as it interacts with new technologies. Viewed in context, Pollman
and Barry's "regulatory entrepreneurs" can be understood as, in fact, a
second generation of entrepreneurs who learned lessons from an earlier
generation that was active in the late 1990s and early 2000s. What both
generations have in common is the idea that the Internet might provide
profitable opportunities at the edges of the legal system. What has changed
is the abandonment of so-called "evasion" strategies-ones that relied on
concealment or geography (described below)-and a migration to
* Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor at Columbia Law School. The author was previously
senior enforcement counsel and special advisor to the New York Attorney General. The opinions
expressed within are not to be attributed to anyone other than the author.
1.
JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLEss WORLD (2006).
2.
Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383
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strategies depending on "avoidance," that is, avoiding the law's direct
application. In particular, the most successful entrepreneurs have relied on
what might be called a mimicry strategy: they shape potentially illegal or
regulated conduct to make it look like legal or unregulated conduct, thereby
hopefully avoiding the weight of laws and regulatory regimes.
I take a different, though not necessarily inconsistent, normative
position than do Pollman and Barry. Law avoidance is a complex
phenomenon. Some of it is undignified avoidance of burdens faced by
others, and it is not much different, normatively, from securities fraud or
tax evasion. But it is also true that, over the long history of the AngloAmerican system, efforts to avoid the law have played an important, and
sometimes essential, role in the process of legal evolution; that is, in the
process of the salutary adaption of our legal system to our current
normative and technological environment. Sometimes technologies may
genuinely make laws obsolete or unnecessary. Sometimes it is changing
social norms that prompt challenges to the law: the best of such efforts, like
forms of legal disobedience during the civil rights era, have become
understood as dignified and justified.
But laws do not challenge themselves: someone or something must
prompt a reevaulation of an existing regime, which I think is the strongest
normative case for some tolerance of regulatory entrepreneurship and other
forms of law avoidance. That said, for such a reexamination to provoke a
full debate, I think it essential that law enforcement play its part in the
dialogue. Sometimes it should vigorously enforce "old laws," unless the
law in question is so obviously moribund that doing so would be ridiculous.
Enforcement creates an adversarial process where we, the public, can
reexamine whether the values and goals that motivated the law's enactment
remain important or valuable today. This is, of course, necessarily an
imperfect process, but one that I think is part of the poorly understood path
of legal evolution. The struggle surrounding the Internet's challenge to law
provides a good opportunity to consider these questions afresh.

Let us return to the 1990s when the Internet and the Web were new, or
at least newish. In those days, the online world was frequently described as
a "place" or a "space" where one went, and the moniker "cyberspace" was
used by respectable people. 3 That metaphor of space helped lead more than
3.

Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN.

L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1996)

("Cyberspace is a place. People live there. They experience all the sorts of things that they experience in
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a few people to think that perhaps the Internet would become a location
where one might do things that the law had previously barred. For who was
to say what law actually governed "cyberspace?" The best legal articulation
of the point came from David Johnson and Robert Post, who wrote in the
Stanford Law Review:
Cyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally
significant (online) phenomena and physical location. The rise of the
global computer network is destroying the link between geographical
location and: (1) the power of local governments to assert control over
online behavior; (2) the effects of online behavior on individuals or
things; (3) the legitimacy of a local sovereign's efforts to regulate global
phenomena; and (4) the ability of physical location to give notice of
which sets of rules apply.4
Meanwhile, the idea of using the Internet as a challenge to territorial
sovereignty was, quite literally, the subject of science fiction. Neal
Stephenson's 1999 novel, Cryptnomicon, presented the exciting premise of
building a "data haven" in some remote country with loose laws, which
might then be accessible from everywhere, thereby rendering the law itself
obsolete.
Perhaps influenced by Cryptnomicon, or by John Perry Barlow's
declaration that "cyberspace" was "sovereign," 5 the first generation of
challengers to the law employed a principal move which can be termed
"geographical evasion." This strategy took advantage of a feature of the
Internet itself: a supposed indifference to national borders, the result of a
design that made sites or addresses accessible from anywhere (that's how
things were in the 1990s, at least, before filtering technologies got better).
Hence, the physical aspects of the illegal activity-whether gambling,
copyright infringement, or the sale of contraband-were simply moved to a
place where it wasn't illegal, but could still be accessed. In practice that
meant the servers, and sometimes the people involved, left the United
States or Europe for some country unconcerned with things like bans on
gambling, foreign copyright laws, or drug laws.
The story of Sealand provides perhaps one of the more colorful
examples of this first-generation strategy. 6 Sealand is a tiny, selfreal space, there.").
4.

David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48

STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1370 (1996) (emphases in original).
5.
John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
6.
About Us, PRINCIPALITY OF SEALAND, www.sealandgov.org/about (last visited Apr. 3, 2017).
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proclaimed kingdom, some seven miles off the coast of England; it is
comprised of an abandoned offshore platform originally built as a sea
fortress during the Second World War. In the early 2000s, a firm named
HavenCo, evidently borrowing Stephenson's idea in Cryptmonicon, set up
servers within the Kingdom of Sealand and proclaimed to the world that
they were now "the first place on earth where people are free to conduct
business without someone looking over their shoulder." 7 The data on
Sealand servers would be "physically secure against any legal action,"
HavenCo boasted.8
While HavenCo didn't meet the success for which its founders had
hoped, 9 a more practical version of the data haven idea succeeded in other
locations, including dozens of gambling sites in small Caribbean nations,
on the rock of Gibraltar, and the Isle of Mann. Similarly, the KaZaa
Company, now forgotten, but once the world's most successful file sharing
company, was invented in Holland by Swedish entrepreneurs who
incorporated the company in Vanuatu, a tiny island in Micronesia. The
Pirate Bay, a more enduring site designed to facilitate piracy, operated with
apparent impunity out of Sweden, then Seychelles, surviving even the
arrest of its founders.10
On the whole, geographic evasion did not prove a strategy of lasting
significance. The empire-or the nation-state-struck back, and over the
2000s largely reestablished the primacy of territorial sovereignty. In other
words, law enforcement managed to reestablish the expectation and
practice that even Internet firms would follow the rules dictated by the
geographically local government." And while the United States was
aggressive in establishing this norm, it was not alone. Other states, in
particular the European nations, and most of all China, were even more
7.

Roy Bates, Rebel Sea Fortress Dreams of Being 'Data Haven,' WALL ST. J., June 26, 2000,

at C21A.
8.
About HavenCo, HAVENCO, http://www.havenco.com/abouthavenco/index.html
(last
visited Jan. 25, 2017) [https://web-beta.archive.org/web/20050810234738/http://www.havenco.com:80/
abouthavenco/index.html].
9.
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 66.
10.
Natasha Lomas, Pirate Bay Co-Founder Peter Sunde Arrested Years After Conviction,
TECHCRUNCH (June 1, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/06/01/pirate-bay-peter-sunde-arrest/.

11.

It is notable that, over the 00s, the "too big to ban" strategy discussed by Pollman and Barry

was not effective standing on its own. That strategy, whose greatest previous success was probably the

Sony Betamax, suggests that regulators or courts won't be willing to move against something that has
millions of users. But in practice, companies like Napster and Grokster, despite having millions of
users, nonetheless were shut down. As we will discuss in a moment, the same phenomenon occurred
with popular online poker sites.
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aggressive. 12 With this movement, the idea of cyberspace as a legal space
died an early death. Law's existential crisis passed.
Looking back, we can see that, for example, in the entertainment
industries, the basic system created by copyright and its associated
licensing regimes buckled and swayed, but did not break. When it came to
video markets (film and television), file sharing sites never fully went away
(consider The Pirate Bay), but ultimately did not prove an existential threat
to the revenue models of Hollywood's mainline entertainment industries.
Some firms like YouTube, always ostensibly compliant with copyright
laws, eventually agreed to filter copyrighted materials more aggressively
and to share revenue surrounding their display. Finally, if the music
industry was transformed to a greater extent than other parts of the
entertainment industry, the rise of online vendors like iTunes and Spotify
legalized the use of the Internet for getting music and essentially
outcompeted the infringing rivals. 13
The same can be said of some of the other major efforts to avoid
restrictive laws. Online gambling was reduced by attacks on key
intermediaries, like credit cards and banks. 14 Some of the early drug sites
were simply shut down and their owners arrested. From the early years,
arguably the only previously-illegal activity to successfully migrate to a
new level of legality was the pornography industry, which survived and
even prospered during the administration of George W. Bush, which was
ostensibly hostile to it.15

Over the 2010s, if broader ideas of a cyber-immunity died, the sense
of opportunity remained. A second generation of law-avoiding
entrepreneurs followed one of two paths. The first centered on improved
tactics of "evasion" and the second centered on better strategies of
"avoidance." The first depended on better technologies to hide from law
enforcement; the second relied on a combination of code design, lawyering,
12. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 65-104.
13.
Spotify, interestingly, sold itself to the music labels as an alternative means of reaching a
generation raised on piracy. See marcel845, Spotify Launches Next Generation Music Platform,
SPOTIFY NEWS (Apr. 27, 2010), https://news.spotify.com/ph/2010/04/27/spotify-launches-nextgeneration-music-platform/ ("Spotify is an innovative music management platform created with the
vision of offering music fans a legal and superior quality user alternative to music piracy.").
14. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 76-77.
15.
See Tim Wu, American Lawbreaking: How Laws Die, SLATE (Oct. 15, 2007, 7:29 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and politics/jurisprudence/features/2007/americanlawbreaking/ho
w laws die.html.
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and political techniques. It was the second that would prove more
influential.
Following the first path, some sites responded to the nation-state's
assertions of legal authority by adopting more technically sophisticated
means for hiding their conduct, yielding what was colloquially called the
"dark web." The best known of these efforts was the Silk Road website and
its successors (there are also lesser-known dark web sites devoted to
providing hacking services, fraud and counterfeiting services, the
organization of terrorism, and child pornography). These sites continued
the strategy of brazen lawbreaking, but tried to conceal it more effectively.
They may have been more successful than their predecessors in some ways,
but were by definition harder to access, and therefore less threatening to the
legal system.
The second strategy was that chronicled in Pollman and Barry's paper,
which is, intrinsically, an "avoidance" strategy. More lawyerly than
technological, regulatory entrepreneurship is about loopholes, grey areas,
"avoision," and the shaping of conduct to appear just right so as to sidestep
unfriendly legal regimes.
Pollman and Barry describe this second strategy as "strategically
operating in a zone of questionable legality or breaking the law until they
can (hopefully) change it." 16 While I don't disagree with this description,
I'd describe the most successful efforts as a "mimicry" strategy, one made
possible, to use an old Larry Lessig-ism, by the "plasticity of code." 17 It
works like this: one avoids a regulatory regime by shaping the conduct in
such a way as to resemble conduct that is both normatively accepted and
considered legal, or at least within a grey zone. The idea is to "redesign[]
behavior for legal advantage." 1 8 The method can be compared to the
strategies used by tax attorneys; it is what Leo Katz calls "avoision," or
efforts to "exploit the differences between a law's goals and its self-defined
limits." 19 Proponents of this strategy hope that with time and good
lobbying, they will be able to gain social, political, and legal acceptance.
An importance difference between the two approaches is rhetorical,
even semiotic. The new generation of regulatory entrepreneurs made
studied efforts to project an image of respect for the law and legal system.
16.
17.

Pollman & Barry, supra note 2, at 399.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).

18.
19.

Tim Wu, When Code Isn 'tLaw, 89 VA. L. REv. 679, 682 (2003).
Id. at 692.
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That stands in stark contrast with the first generation and their dark web
descendants, who made, at best, only minimal efforts to shape their
behavior to look good-and were anything but polite about it. Their
lawbreaking was brazen, sometimes proudly so. Anarchy and libertarian
rhetoric was the norm, and there was no kowtowing done or lobbyists
employed. Instead, the idea was to give users exactly what they wanted,
law be damned, by relying on the magic of the aterritorial Internet or strong
encryption techniques. Consider that the first online gambling sites offered
roulette, blackjack, and slots-the kind of things you find in a casino. The
music sharing sites made some pretense of claiming to be about sharing
rather than piracy, but not in a manner that was particularly convincing.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's Grokster decision, which sank the file sharing
industry, such as it was, fixated on the fact that, when it came down to it,
these were companies whose entire identity depended on inducing piracy. 20
Silk Road and the dark web sites, which arose in the 2010s, were
perhaps most brazen of all. It was immediately obvious to any user that
Silk Road was not the Internet version of Sears Roebuck, but rather an
underground bazaar for buying illegal drugs and other contraband like
forged passports or bomb-making manuals. Here's how its founder, who
went by "Dread Pirate Roberts," described the site:
Silk Road was founded on libertarian principles and continues to be
operated on them. It is a great idea and a great practical system .

. .

. The

same principles that have allowed Silk Road to flourish can and do work
anywhere human beings come together. The only difference is that the
State is unable to get its thieving murderous mitts on it. 2 1
To say that today's regulatory entrepreneurs have tried to distance
themselves from Silk Road's image is merely to state the obvious. Like the
first generation, the second generation-firms like Airbnb, Uber, and Daily
Fantasy-faced (and sought out) hostile regulatory regimes. But instead of
brazenly challenging those laws, they argued that they were perfectly fine
laws that were just meant for someone else.
A counterfactual might make the difference clear. If Uber had been
invented in 2000, it might have called itself the "Dreaded Gypsy-Cabs
20.

Metro-Golden-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939 (2004) ("[E]ach

company showed itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright
infringement. .. .").
21.
Andy Greenberg, Collected Quotations of the Dread Pirate Roberts, Founder of

Underground Drug Site Silk Road and Radical Libertarian, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2013, 9:28 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/04/29/collected-quotations-of-the-dread-pirateroberts-founder-of-the-drug-site-silk-road-and-radical-libertarian/#6de69c894f5 1.
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Grokster" or something similar and provided an encrypted, secret way to
get at cheaper taxi services, probably throwing in some tax avoidance for
good measure. It would have probably based itself in the Caribbean, and its
founders might have been even more vocal about their contempt for the
regulatory state. It would also have provided an even bigger target for local
law enforcement, and probably led to the U.S. indictment of the founders at
some point. The real Uber, while providing a similar challenge to the
regulatory system, was far more lawyerly and political about doing so. It
seized on the legality of private car services (black cars) in some markets
and some of the norms of ride-sharing, and made itself into at least a quasilegitimate firm that remained, nonetheless, a major challenge to the
regulatory regime that governs taxicabs. It also used its users to threaten
politicians, a tactic that file sharing sites never convincingly managed to
use.
The story of online gambling offers perhaps the clearest example of
this evolution from evasion to avoidance. The original Internet gambling
sites were, as we've said, virtual replicas of casinos, usually located
overseas. This scheme worked until a crackdown in 2002 by then-New
York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, after which the online casinos lost
access to the easiest ways for gamblers to fund their accounts-Visa,
MasterCard, and major banks. 22 This made their expansion difficult and
confined the casinos to a customer base of hardcore gamblers willing to go
through the hassle of wiring money to overseas entities. In what amounted
to a second round, online gambling had a comeback in the mid-2000s with
the opening of a series of online poker rooms, some backed by prominent
poker celebrities like Howard Lederer, the "Professor of Poker," who lent
his name to a firm named "Full Tilt Poker." 23 The legal theory of the poker
rooms, such as it was, was that poker was a game of skill and therefore did
not constitute gambling under federal or state laws. (Displaying some lack
of confidence in their theory, the sites were also, for good measure, located
overseas.)
Online poker had a decent run in the United States that lasted until
April 15, 2011, the so-called "Black Friday" of the industry. On that day,
Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
seized the domain names of the major poker firms (Pokerstars, Full Tilt,
22.
See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 82.
23.
Michael Friedman, Team Full Tilt: The World's FirstPoker Dynasty, CARDPLAYER (Aug. 8,
2006), http://www.cardplayer.com/cardplayer-poker-magazines/65595-team-full-tilt-19-15/articles/155
97-team-fulltilt-the-world-39-s-first-poker-dynasty [http://archive.li/jBrZZ].
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and Absolute Poker) and criminally indicted all of their founders on
charges of money laundering, bank fraud, and violations of the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act. 24 Suffice it to say that online poker, at
least in the United States, did not prosper thereafter.
As poker proved a bust, a man named Nigel Eccles, who was involved
in the earlier versions of online gambling, came up with a new strategy that
depended more cleverly on the mimicry described above. The founders of
this new strategy noticed the general social acceptance of fantasy sports
leagues (in which players draft a virtual "team" of players who then
compete against the virtual teams of other players, based on their actual
performance), and a favorable exception in the federal law that seemed to
exempt fantasy sports from a general ban on online gambling. 25 The only
problem was that fantasy sports leagues typically took an entire season to
play one "round," making it unsuitable as a high volume gambling product.
The solution was a new product, "Daily Fantasy Sports," which condensed
the fantasy product into something that could be played on a daily basis,
and, moreover, made it possible to place dozens or even hundreds of bets at
once. 26 In other words, it was a gambling product that, unlike poker or
blackjack, had a good reputation and wasn't even understood by most
people to be gambling at all.
Seen this way, the invention of Daily Fantasy Sports can be
understood as an effort to side-step the gambling laws, not by moving
overseas, but by imitating something both socially accepted and if not
clearly legal, at least arguably legal. By virtue of their purported legality,
the main two fantasy sports companies, Fanduel and DraftKings, were able
to attract partnerships with legitimate entities including Major League
Baseball and the National Football League, attract investments from major
banks, and were able to run advertising on networks that otherwise banned
advertisements for gambling.
The legal theory supporting Daily Fantasy Sports was, in practice, a
24.
Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges
Principals of Three Largest Internet Poker Companies with Bank Fraud, Illegal Gambling Offenses, and
Laundering Billions in Illegal Gambling Proceeds (Apr. 15, 2011), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/
newyork/press-releases/20 11/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-charges-principals-of-three-largest-internetpoker-companies-with-bank-fraud-illegal-gambling-offenses-and-laundering-billions-in-illegalgambling-proceeds.

25. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(E)(ix) (2012)
(exempting participation in fantasy sports from the definition of "bet or wager"); Complaint at 8, New
York v. DraftKings, Inc., No. 453054/2015, 2015 WL 7290279 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 17, 2015).
26. See Complaint, DraftKings, 2015 WL 7290279, at 1. New York State's suit against
DraftKings was later settled, providing that DraftKings would cease to operate in New York.
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little shakier than as represented by the firms to their investors. Another
New York Attorney General, Eric Schneiderman, filed suit in 2015,
alleging that Daily Fantasy Sports was simply a new form of illegal
gambling (namely, sports wagering or pool betting, long illegal in New
York). And the Attorney General, like his predecessors, met with initial
success in the courts. 27 But the ending of the Daily Fantasy Sports story
differed from that of the last two rounds, for during round three, the New
York Legislature became convinced that the best course of action was to
legalize and regulate fantasy gambling, citing, among other things, its
popularity. 28 Hence, unlike their predecessors in online gambling, Daily
Fantasy Sports has managed to achieve both a legality and lasting influence
that evaded its predecessors. It also effected, if not a full legalization of
online gambling in New York, a partial legalization of it, and as such, was
a successful strategy of regulatory entrepreneurship.
If one looks carefully at other regulatory entrepreneurs, the same
patterns are evident. Airbnb, a platform for leasing rooms for short terms,
faced the challenge of the extensive regulations that govern hotels. Running
underground hotels itself wasn't going to fly normatively or legally. On the
other hand, practices like vacation rentals, subletting, and the casual renting
out of rooms have long been tolerated. Airbnb took advantage of this latter
norm-though its approach has not been without setbacks, especially, once
again, in the state of New York. There, the legislature, unlike its approach
to gambling, acted to increase the penalties for private room-sharing. 29
The mimicry approach doesn't always work, as the story of Aereo
suggests. Aereo was a company, backed by media mogul Barry Diller, that
provided a television service by allowing its customers to lease tiny
antennas located remotely. It was, at some level, an easier way to get
broadcast television without the trouble of buying and installing an
antenna. But it was also, at another level, a challenge to the copyright
regime that governs the cable industry and requires it to pay for the
retransmission of content.3 0 Predictably, Aereo was immediately sued for
27.

See Trial Order at 1, New York v. Fanduel, Inc., No. 453056/15, 2015 WL 8490461 (N.Y.

Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2015) (enjoining and restraining Fanduel and DraftKings from doing business in the
state of New York).

28.

S. 8153, 2015-16 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2016) ("[T]he Internet has become an integral part of

society, and interactive fantasy sports a major form of entertainment for many consumers . . . .").

29.

S. 6340A, 2015-16 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2016). Signed into law on October 21, 2016, the bill

makes it illegal within the five boroughs of New York City to advertise entire homes on home sharing
websites like Airbnb for occupancies fewer than 30 days.

30.

17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012).
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copyright infringement, and while the Second Circuit bought the remote
antenna idea, unfortunately for Aereo, the Supreme Court didn't. Instead,
the Court condemned the company as a regulatory end run, 31 which of
course it was, but then again, so are many companies.
Aereo isn't the only instance of failed mimicry. In some marketsparticularly Europe-regulators, unimpressed with the rhetoric of ridesharing, have similarly opined that Uber is nothing but an illegal taxi
service. And when New York passed a new bill increasing the fines
dramatically for Airbnb hosts, the Governor's office opined that Airbnb's
services were "already expressly prohibited by law." 32

Stepping back, what is one to make of these challenges to the laws
and what Pollman and Barry describe as regulatory entrepreneurship? And,
to take a question of some personal interest, just what should law
enforcement do when faced with what is, when examined carefully, an
effort that depends on avoiding an extant regulatory regime? In their piece,
Pollman and Barry describe certain potential benefits and limitations, with
which I agree, but I wish to explore a more jurisprudential assessment.
At bottom, law avoidance is complex: it can represent social disorder
or unfair opportunism, yet also, paradoxically, play an important role in the
democratic process and the evolution of a legal system. For this reason, I
think any blanket condemnation or blind acceptance of law avoidance is
simply inappropriate. Consider that law avoidance has particular bearing on
the well-known problem of generational sovereignty first discussed by
Thomas Jefferson. The laws on the books represent a judgment at a certain
time and place, by one generation, that reflects both prevailing norms and
technological reality of that time, yet may have little to do with what
following generations think about an issue. As Jefferson put it, it is the
question of whether "one generation of men has a right to bind another?" 33
For what we think about something like drinking alcohol, smoking
marijuana, gay marriage, or other issues can and does change. Yet laws do
not reexamine themselves-there needs to be a prompting of some kind.
Law avoiders, like those described in this Article, can be understood as
providing one means for the reexamination of old laws, and to that extent
31.

See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2509-10 (2014).

32.

Katie Benner, Airbnb Sues Over New Law Regulating New York Rentals, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.

21, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2n513kA.
33.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE PARIS, 1784-1789, 305, 305 (Brett F. Woods ed., 2016).
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play a salutary role in a democratic system.
This is hardly an endorsement of lawbreaking. Much of the breach of
existing laws, especially the core criminal laws, are acts of evil, universally
condemned, and not novel questions for the democratic system. Other
lawbreaking constitutes harm to others, such as the many varieties of fraud
perpetrated on consumers and investors. Some is mere opportunism-tax
evasion, flouting of environmental laws, avoidance of health and safety
laws-all efforts to avoid burdens borne by others. None of these
categories of lawbreaking, in the usual course, raises important questions
for law's evolution.
But there is a narrower category of lawbreaking that raises questions
about which there exists true uncertainty in the law and either an existing
division of public opinion or an underdeveloped debate. Consider the
former illegality of sodomy in most states, which left many gay men as
lawbreakers-but surely of a different kind than the ordinary criminal.
While less fundamental or moral, the questions raised by Airbnb, Uber, or
daily fantasy sports are challenging ones, worthy of public debate. Do we
really think gambling is wrong or dangerous, or, with the proliferation of
state lotteries and casinos across the country, do we no longer care? Is
commercial sharing of private rooms or apartments through Airbnb
desirable, or a menace? These are questions over which reasonable people
disagree, and some of the disagreement may vary by location and
community. Dwellers of New York City, which is dense and crowded, have
been notably more hostile to Airbnb than inhabitants of other areas, where
neighbors are not in such close proximity.
The point is that a debate over such questions can be a healthy
process, and notably, is not one with a predictable outcome. It may result in
a rededication to the old laws (as largely happened in copyright) or an
abandonment of the laws (as with pornography) or something in-betweena compromise, as with Uber. The result may also differ by place, as with
Airbnb.
I wish also to address what role law enforcement should play, and here
I should disclose that my views were formed working at the New York
Attorney General's office, where we faced much of this conduct head on.
In my view, law enforcement can and should play its proper role in the
dialogue, which will usually mean faithfully enforcing the existing law if it
can be fairly read to illegalize the conduct in question-if the law is not so
obviously moribund as to make its enforcement an absurdity.
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That may seem obvious, but it hasn't always been the position taken.
It is indefensible, in my view, to simply decline to enforce the law on the
premise that it was not written with "this" in mind. To do so is to create a
loophole machine. Of course, there is such a thing as prosecutorial
discretion, and I would agree that a law that is hopelessly out of date or
absurd should not be enforced (consider, for example, the ban on
fornication, still largely extant). But prosecutorial discretion does not and
should not go as far as the usurpation of the legislative process, which is
what non-enforcement amounts to. Instead, assuming there is an apparent
violation of existing law, I think it is the proper role of law enforcement to
begin faithfully executing the laws as written-and through that
mechanism, actually learn what the public, stakeholders, and the legislature
really think about the conduct in question. Ultimately, if the legislature
decides it wants to change the law, it can. This position may sometimes
make law enforcement unpopular in some quarters, but it is the more
principled position.
Some might object that this approach is too deferential to legislatures,
which themselves are hardly models of enlightened judgment. Looking
back at the last twenty years, it is evident that well-represented groups, like
the entertainment industry or hotel lobby, have had greater success keeping
intact the laws designed to protect them, as compared with, say, the
families who are harmed by gambling's effects but have no legislative
voice, or the men and women who are swept into the pornography industry.
But the legislature remains our system for translating norms into law, and
in the end, we live not in the ideal world, but in this more unfortunate one.
Perhaps all that should be said is that legislatures should take pains to try
and understand the evil to which the original law was directed and see
whether it is something that the public still cares about. I don't much care
for referenda, but perhaps this is one place where it might be appropriate,
given that the questions are usually, at some levels, matters of public
morality.

Looking back over the last twenty years, what is probably most
surprising is how resilient the basic legal and regulatory paradigm proved
to be despite such dramatic changes in technology. If Internet avoidance
was a kind of front line of a challenge to the nation-state, it seems clear that
the nation-state won; companies like Uber or Airbnb are clearly within and
part of the system, and are not a real challenge to it. What we see in
regulatory entrepreneurship in this sense falls within a more conventional
public choice analysis than within the Internet's first challenges to the legal
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system. No one will write a science fiction book about Airbnb's lobbying
efforts.
But overall, the experience may have ultimately taught us something
about the nature of law itself. Law, as John Austin wrote, consists primarily
of commands backed by threats of force. 34 So long as we retain our
physical identities, and as long as we, or a company, have to be
somewhere, the power of law remains unavoidable. Yes, it can be shaped,
avoided, moderated, and changed-that is what regulatory entrepreneurship
is all about. But the leviathan remains, essentially unchallenged on his
throne. At least for now.
34.
See JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (1875). I say "primarily" in deference to H.
L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law.

